

























What Should Autonomous Agents Be Like? : 
From the Individualistic to the Substantive Conception
Shotaro TAHARA
????????
?This paper focuses on interpretation of autonomy. This paper pursues two related ends. Autonomy is generally 
understood as an independence from others, and a common view is that autonomy is an ideal that promotes this 
independence. This is called individualistic conception of autonomy. This paper’s first goal is to give an 
alternative conception of autonomy. Individualistic conception is often criticized in contemporary debates, 
because it underestimates or denies such things as love, friendship, and interdependence, which most people 
consider valuable. It is required to develop an understanding of autonomy that outstrips the individualistic 
conception. This paper tries to meet this need by elaborating on a conception of autonomy that is compatible with 
human relationships.
?This attempt is chiefly based on a substantive conception of autonomy. This paper examines what the 
substantive conception entails and how it incorporates human relationships. This paper also addresses tasks which 
the contemporary debate of autonomy should approach on close examination of the substantive conception. This 
revelation of tasks for a future study of autonomy is the second end of this paper.
?The first section of this essay describes the traditional individualistic conception of autonomy and its flaws. The 
second section deals with the mainstream hierarchical conception of autonomy and how it outstrips the 
individualistic conception. In the third and fourth section, this paper introduces a strong and weak substantive 
conception of autonomy and argues that these conceptions are generally superior to hierarchical ones. The fifth 
section points out a difficulty of the substantive conception of autonomy and suggests a way to get around said 
difficulty. This proposal also identifies tasks for the future study of autonomy.
WASEDA RILAS JOURNAL NO. 5
194



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































??Lorraine Code, “Second Persons”, in her What can She 
Know?, Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 77-78.
????????Code, “Second Persons”, p. 80. 
??Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationship: 
Rethinking the Feminist Critique”, in Diana Tietjens Meyers 
(ed.), Feminists Rethink the Self, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 
47-51.
??Gerald Dworkin, the Theor y and Practice of Autonomy, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 20.
??Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of 
a Person”, in his The Importance of What We Care about: 









??Dworkin, the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, pp. 21-25.













??Dworkin, the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 28.
??Dworkin, the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 25.
??Dworkin, the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 23.
??Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, in 
Catriona Mackenzie, Natalie Stoljar (eds.). Relational Auton-
omy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the 
Social Self, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 94-111.
??Elizabeth Anderson, “Should Feminist Reject Rational 
Choice Theory?”, in Louse M. Antony, Charlotte E. Witt 
(eds.), A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason 
and Objectivity, Westview Press, 2002, p. 375.
??Anderson, “Should Feminist Reject Rational Choice The-
ory?”, p. 375, p. 385.










??Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, p. 98.
??Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, p. 109.
??Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, the Journal 
of Philosophy, 1994, pp. 650-668.
??Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 650.
??Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 659.
??Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, p. 664.
????????????Paul Benson, ”Feminist Intuitions 
and the Normative Substance of Autonomy”, in James Stacey 
Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal 
Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 130-132; Stoljar, 
“Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition”, pp. 107-109.
????????Paul Benson, “Feminist Intuitions and the 
Normative Substance of Autonomy”, p. 136; Stoljar, “Auton-
omy and the Feminist Intuition”, p. 109.
??Jenifer Worriner, “Gender Oppression and Weak Substan-
tive Theories of Autonomy”, in Marina A. L. Oshana (ed.), 
Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical 

























????????????????Dworkin, the Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy, p.15, 31.
??V 33.
??????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
???????????????????????
???????????????????????????
